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Summary findings
Many  developing  countries  now actively  solicit  foreign  foreign  equity  participation  are  strongly  correlated  with
investment,  offering  foreign  firms subsidies,  tax holidays,  increases  in plant productivity.
and exemptions  from import duties.  One justification  for  Second,  they measure  the impact  of joint  ventures  and
subsidizing  these firms  is the so-called  spillover  of  foreign  subsidiaries  on plants  with no foreign  investment.
technology  from foreign  to domestic  firms.  Facing  fewer data limitations  than in previous  studies,
Usinf panel data - following  more than 4,000  they find that foreign  investment  negatively  affects  the
Venezuelan  firms from 1975 through 1989  - Aitken  productivity  of domestically  owned plants.
and Harrison  explore two aspects  of the effect  of foreign  Thes: results  suggest  that whatever  technology  gains
direct investment.  occur through foreign  investment  are captured  entirely
First,  they examine  the relative  performa.ice  of joint  by joint ventures.
ventures and domestic  firms.  They find  that increases  in
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In the 1980s,  the disappearance  of non-equity  sources  of forelgn capital created a resurgence  of
interest in direct foreign investment  (DFI).  The need for alternative  sources  of capital, combined  with
an increasing  skepticism about import substituting  trade strategies, led many developing  countries to
liberalize  restrictions  on incoming  foreign  investment. Some  countries  actually  tiUted  the balance  towards
foreign  firms by offeing special incentives:  in Mexico,  the maquiladora  firms pay no income taxes; in
much  of the Caribbean,  forein  firms  receive  income  tax holidays,  import  duty exemptions,  and subsidies
for infrastructure. 'Me expectation  that foreln  investment  serves as a catalyst  for  rimaetic  production
has led countries such as Taiwan and Bulgaria to offer special treatment for foreign firms in high
technology  sectors.
Can these subsidies be justifiod?  Apart from the employment and capital inflows which
accompany foreign investment, multinational  activity may generate knowledge transfers or  new
technology  to domestic  firms.'  If foreign firms introduce new products or processes to the dcmestic
market, domestic firms may benefit from the accelerated  diffusion of now technology (ceece, 1977;
Davies, 1977). In some cases, domestic  firms may increase productivity  simply by observing nearby
foreip firms. In other cases, diffusion  may  occur from labor  turnover  as domestic  employees  move  from
foreign  to domestic  firms. Several  studies  have shown  that foreign  finns initiate  more on-the-job  training
programs than their domestic counterpats (Edfelt, 1975; Gonclaves, 1986; Watson, 1972).  If these
benefits from  foreip  investment  are not completely  internalized  by the incoming  firm, some type of
subsidy could  be justified.
Case sttdies present mixed evidence  on the role of foreign investment  in gSerating technology
transfer  to domestic  fims.  In Mauritius  and Bangladesh,  studies  suggest  that the entry of several  foreip
'See Caves (1982), and Heleinor (1989) for surveys of technology transfer «d  foreip  direct
investment.firms led to the creation of a booming,  domestically-ownted  eAport  industry  for textiles  (Rhee and Belot
(1990)). Mansfield  and Romeo  (1980),  however, found  In a survey  ot ;5 multinationals  that only a small
share had accelerated  access  to process technology  for local competitors. A 1970s  study commissioned
by the OECD of 65 subsidiaries  in twelve  developing  countries  found almost  no evidence  of technology
transferred to local competitors  (see Germidis (1977)). The lack of spillovers  to domestic flru  was
attributed  to a number  of factors,  including  limited  hiring  of domestic  employees  in higher  level  positibns,
very little labor mobility  between  domestic  firms and foreign  subsidiaries,  limited  subrontracting  to local
firms, no research and development  by the subsidiaries,  and few incentives  by multinatioiWs  to diffuse
their knowledge  to  3cal competitors.
Few recearchers  have attempted  to go beyond qualitative  case study evidence.  In a pioneering
paper, Caves (1974) tested for the impact  of foreign presence  on value-added  per worker in Australian
domestically-owned  manufacturing  sectors. Caves found  that the positive disparity  between  foreign and
domestic  value-added  per worker disappears  as foreign  firms employed  an increasing  share of t!.e labor
in the sector, which is consistent  with the spillover hypothesis. Globerman (1979) replicated  Caves
(1974)  using sectoraj, cross-section  data for Canadian  manufacturing  industries  in 1972. The results are
consistent  with a weak spillover  effect.
Yet spillovers  from foreign investment  are likely to be much larger in industrializing  countries,
where the gap between  domestic  and foreign  productivity  may be significant. Most  of the empirical  work
on technology spillovers from foreign investment  in developing countries has focused on Mexico.
Blomstrom  and Persson (1983), Blomstrom  (1986), and Blomstrom  and Wolff (1989)  generally  find that
sectors with higher foreign  ownership  exhibited  higher  levels of productivity,  faster  productivity  growth
and faster convergence  of productivity  levels to US norms. 2
2Blomstrom  (1989)  provides a synthesis  of his previous work  on the impact  of foreign investment  in
MexiSo.
2I
None of the previous studies use firm-level  data, restricting the authors' ability to  examine
domestic  and foreign  firm behavior  separately. In this paper, we use ^.' .ual census data on Venezuelan
firms, averaging  over 4,000 firms annually,  to examine  two related  issues. First, to what extent  do joint
ventures  or wholly owned foreign subsidiaries  exhibit higher levels of productivity  than tieir domestic
counterparts?  Second, can we identify any technology 'spillovers'  from these foreign entrants to
dornestically  owned firms?
All previous attempts to  measure spillover effects fiom foreign investment face a  critical
identification  problem: if foreign investment  gravitates  towards more productive industries, then the
positive impact  of foreign  presence on domestic  firm productivity  will be over-estimated. As a result,
one could  find a positive  spillover  from foreign  investment  v7here  no spillover  occurs. This paper  differs
from previous studies by using the differences  in foreign investment  across regions and over time to
identify  technology  spillo-ers within  each industry.  Unlike  previous studies, we observe the behavior  of
each plant over time, which allows us to control for fixed differences in productivity  levels across
industries.
We  find  a  strong relationship between increased foreign equity participation and  plant
performance, suggesting that individual  plants do benefit from foreign investment.  We also find,
however, that productivity  across domestic  plants falls when foreign investment  increases. Section 2
presents a theoretical  framework  which takes into account the possible benefits as well as the copts  of
foreign  investment. Section 3 describes  the policy environment  and compares  the behavior  of domestic
and foreign plants.  Section  4 presents the results from testing for technology  spillovers from foreign
plants, while Section  S concludes.
32  Foregn Invetment, Competdt0on  and  Technology  Spillovurs:  The Frnmework
The  so-called "Industrial organization" approach to  DFI  in  manufacturing suggests that
multinationals  can compete  locally  with more informed  domestic  firms because  multinationals  posses a
nontangible  productive asset, such as technological  inowhow, marketing  and managih,g  skills, export
contacts, coordinated  relationships  with suppliers and customers, and repuItation.' Since the assets are
almost always gained through experience,  they cannot be e sily licensed  to host country  firms, but can
be costlessly  transferred  to  subsidiaries  who locate in host countrles  either to circumvent  trade barion
or produce with  cheap  local labor (Teece, 1977).
Although the intangible firm-specific asset may not be  licensed, domestic industry might
nonetheless  benefit from the presence of frcreign  firms.  As workers employed by fo:eign firms or
participating  in joint ventures  gain experience,  for example,  they may accumulate  knowledge  which is
valued outside the firm; foreign firms exert an externality  by increasing  the domestic stock of human
capital.  As experienced workers leave the foreign firms, this human capital becomes available to
domestic  firms, raising  their measured  productivity. Likewise,  some firm-specific  knowledge  of foreign
firms might 'spill over' to domestic  industry  as domestic  firms are exposed  to new products, prusduction
and marketing  techniques,  or receive  technical  support.  fronm  upstreamn  or downstream  foreign firms. In
addition, foreign  firms may act as a stable source  of demand  for inputs in an industry, which can benefit
upstream domestic firms by  allowing them to  train  and maintain relationships with experienced
employees. In all these  cases, foreign  presence  would  raise  the productivity  of domestically-owned  firms.
But foreigi presence  can also reduce  total factor productivity  of domestically-owned  firms.  In
an environment  in which imperfectly  competitive  domestic  firms face fixed costs of production,  foreign
'See  Rymer (1960) Caves (1971), and more recently Horstman and Markusen (1989), Helpman
(1984), and Krugman  (1983). For Surveys,  see Rugman  (1986), Crieco (1986).
4firms producing for the local market can steal demand fron) domestic firms, causing them to  cut
production. The productivity  of domestic  firms would  fall as they spread their fixod  costs over a smaller
maxket,  forcing them back up their average  costs curves.  If the productivity  decline from this demand
effect is large enmgh, as shown in Figure 1, net domestic  productivity  can decline even if some of the
firm-specific  asset spills over.
We formalize uCese  two effects of foreign activity  on domestic plants in s simple theoretical
framework. We begin with a Cobb-Douglas  production  function  characterized  by constant returns to
scale  with respect  to the variable  input. Each firm employs  a single  input (x), and faces an identical  fixed
cost F expresse. in units of output. For each firm I ir. sectorj producing  output q this can be captured
through the following  specification:
q10  Ax, - F  for  Ax5*F  (1)
q1 -0 for Ax, s F
From the production  function,  domestic  firm I's cost function will be
C,  w  1 ,  (q,  .FP)  (2)
A
where w Is the gvage  pa.d to Input  x.  Defining  marginal  cost m  =  w  , total costs can be expressed  as
A
C, am  (q+,F)  (3)
The price  firms receive for the  good (P) varies with the  sum of  output produced by
5domestically-owned  firms Q and output  by foreign-owned  fl ms QM
P=  A -Q-Q*  (4)
Foreign-owned  output Q* it assumed to be exogenous. This assumption  is based on the belief that
foreign entry and expansion  i" developing  countries  is typically  determined  by outside  factors, such as
political  risk, domestic  resource  ondowments,  technological  superiority,  lower labor  cosu, transport  costs,
and infrastructure.
If domestic  firms maxim:e profits in a Cournot  competitive  manner, we can solve (3) for q%  ad
combine with (4) to yield the standard  Cournot  reaction  function
qm  p  (5)
where n is the number of domestic firms in the indr ;try.  An increases in foreign investment  is
represented  as an increase  in Q*, and causes a fall in output  by domestically-owned  firms.'
To model the technology transfer from foreign-owned  firms to domestic firms, we assume
domestic  productivity  is given by
A,  111a6QO  (6)
If a  is positive, domestic  firms receive positive spillovers  from foreign investment. We now combine
equation (6) with the reaction function in equation (5) to derive our estimating equation giving the
lomestic firm's output as a fuinction  of inputs and foreign investment. The production function for
domestic fums in a given industry  can be rewritten from (1) as
'A more extensive  version of the theoretical  model, which allows fo; endogenous  entry and exit by
domestic firms, is derived in the appendix.
6g,=zAl , _ AF  (7)
Rearranging,  this is equal to
qd  =A x(  (8)
Taking  logs and substituting  firm output q, (Q) from '1) together  with (6), equation  (8) becomes
I*gq  4 oSg  ,+6Q'+log  x-  F  (9)
q(Q')
To determine  the nature of the last term in equation  0),  we replace  q (Q) with the relationship  in (5)
and linearize  aF  t Q5  0  to get
q(QT)
- z  -F(n+l)  +yQ  =C  + y Q  (IOA)
q(Q')  P-M
where
y5.  F  d  - (n+l)  (1OB)
q2(0) dQ*  (-rn) 2
7'Me coefficient  y  will be negatve  when lncroasr in Q cause  domestic  flrm output to contract  since,
*Om (5),  dQ  '
dQ
Suktituting equation IOA  into equation  9 gives domestic  firm output  as a function  of inputs and
foreign investm.mnt
loS  q - log  -, +  Q. +  log  x +  C+yQ  (11)
-C+ logx#  +  (t +y)Q'  log  'i1
Foreign presence affects domestic  total factor productivity  through two distinct channels.  First,
foreign presence can raise domestic plant productivity  through technology  spillovers, captured in the
model  by the coefficient  alpha. The term y captures  the negative  impact  of foreign  presence  on domestic
productivity  when increases in foreign activity lower the level of output optimally chosen by each
domestic firm. The value of -y  will be negati e if an increase in foreign presence  reduces  domestic  tow  I
factor productivity  by causing  domestic  output to contract.'  Since these two e.fects move in opposite
I We  have also considered  the possibility  that foreign  investment  cw'ld affect  domestic  returns  to scale
when  there are no fixed costs. '  there are fixed  costs with constant  retuvis to scale Li  factor inputs, then
the negative  scale effects of Q  n TFP is correctly  estimated  by a log linear specification;  variations  in
inputs  will  properly  estimats  input  coefficients,  and the Q*  variable  will  capture  the fixet cost component.
To the extent, however, that there are increasing  returns to scale  on inputs and no fixed  costs (ie a Cobb-
sdirections, estimation  of  quation 11) is required to determine  the net effect of foreign presence on
domesta:  productivity.
3.  Foreign and Domestlc Firnm  In Venezuela
Foreign ownership in Venezuela  is restricted  to minority partIcipation  only in somw  areas  of
manufacturing,  such as basic industies (iron, steel, and aluminum)  and is only excluded  from investing
In manufacturing  enterprises  in the petroleum  sector.  Although foreign investment  in Venezuela  has
generally averaged  less than 10 percent of total assets in Venezuela's  manufacturing  sector (Table 1),
reforms initiated  in 1986  and extended  in 1990 are likely to incre  e its role.'
The dataset employed in this paper is taken from the Venezuelan  industrial survey (Enquesta
Douglas  specification  with the sum of the coefficients  greater than unity), then the negative  impact  of an
increase  in Q* will be underestima  by a log linear specification:  variations in productlvity  associated
with changes  in scale will be reflected  by variations  in inputs. In Venezuela,  the degree  of bias is likely
to be small since  the estimates  reported  in the paper suggest  zoustant  returns to scale in factor inputs.
Venezuelan  firms are classified  by degree of foreign ownership  into three types: national,  with less
than 20 percent foreign  ownership;  mixed with 20 to 49.9 percent foreign  ownership; and foreign  fimns,
with majority foreign control.  Until 1989, the Superintendencia  de Inversiones Extranjeras (SIEX)
exercised  subs  .atial  discretion  in regulating  the inflow  of foreign investment. Profit remittances  were
limited  to 20 percent (plus  LABOR)  of the investment  (based on book value).  Since purchasing  equity
in existing firms was prohibited, foreign investment  could only be in the form of direct investment
registered with SIEX.  Payments  by a firm for its foreign partner's technology  were prohibited, and
contracts  that called  for royalty or patent payments  needed  SIEX approval.
During the period from 1975  to 1989, foreign firms were discriminated  against  in a number of
differen;  ways. First, they faced higher  tax rates on corporate  income-SO  percent versus 35 percent for
domestic  firms. lhey were also restricted  from imposirg confidentiality  and exclusive  use of trade secrets
in joint ventures. Finally, foreign  firms were obliged  to buy bolivares  at the official  exchange  rate rather
than the free market rate.
In  1989, the restriction on profit repatriation was elininated.  Bureaucratic discretion was
eliminated  and SIMX  was authorized  to teject foreign  investment  applications  only if they did not comply
with the sectoral :estrictions  discussed  above. When exchange  rates  were unified  following  reforms, the
discrepancy  between  official  and free market  exchange  rates were eliminated. The restrictions  on use of
confidentiality  and trade secret requirements  are currently being negotiated  as part of agreements  on
property  rights, and the differential  tax rates  between  foreign  and domestic  fums is addressed  in pending
tax legislation.
9Industrat), which is conducted  annually  by the National  Statistical  Bureau  (Oficina  Central de Estadistica
e Infonmatica,  OCE!). The years covered include 1976  through 1989, with the exception  of 1980 (the
industrial  survey is not taken in census years).  The Enquesta  Industrial  covers all plants in the formal
sector with more than 50 workers, as well as a large sample of smaller plants. For the smaller  plants,
OCEI  calculates  the sample  weights, permitting  aggregation  of output  and other variables  to estimate  the
total value for the entire manufacturing  sector. The number  of plants ranges from a low of 3,955 plants
in 1982  to a high of 6,044 plants in 1978. The data contain information  on foreign ownership,  assets,
employment,  detailed cost information,  location,  and product destination. RespoLdents  are guaranteed
anonymity  in responding  to the survey.  Since the industrial census  gives the percentage  of subscribed
capital  owned  by domestic  investors,  it is possible  to derive  the mean share  of foreign  investment  by year,
location, and sector. Table I shows the mean weighted  share of the stock of FDI in manufacturing  for
selected  years, using number  cf employees  as the weight. 7 Table 2 shows  that the majority  of the stock
of foreign investment  over 1975-89  has been in autos (machinery,  transport and metal products), basic
metals (iron, steel, and aluminum),  chemicals,  and food and beverages.
Table 3  compares the performance  of foreign and domestic firms in terms of their labor
productivity,  export  and import behavior,  and wages. On average, foreign  owned firms exhibited  higher
labor productivity,  a higher propensity  to import as well as export, and  paid higher wages than their
domestic  counterparts. The net contribution  of foreign firms to foreign exchange  earnings,  defined as
export sales less expenditures on imported inputs, is  also higher than for  domestic firms.  The
comparative  results are robust to corrections  for size, capital intensity,  and skill composition  of foreign
versus domestic  firms.
The magnitude  of technology  transfer from foreign to domestic  firms is likely to depend  on the
7Since  foreign  firms tend to be more capital  intensive  than domestic  firms, the share of foreign  fuims
is significantly  higher if weighted  by physical  capital.
10magnitude of the productivity  advantages  exhibited by joint ventures.  Although labor productivity
provides one measure of technology  advantage,  it is an imperfect  measure since it varies with capital
intensity as well as with the level of other factor inputs.  Therefore, we compared the total factor
productivity  of the two sets of plants.
To compare  the levels  of total factor  productivity  between  domestic  plants  and plants  with foreign
equity  participation,  output  is regressed  on the type of ownership  (foreign/domestic)  of the plant, as well
as the plant's capital, materials, skilled labor, unskilled  labor, and industry (at the four digit level).
Output is calculated  as the value of sales less the change in inventories, deflated  by a four-digit  level
production  price deflator. Skilled  and unskilled  labor are measured  as the number  of skilled and unskilled
employees.  Although an ideal measure of labor input would be the number of hours worked, this
information  is only availab'e for selected  years.  Material  costs are adjusted  for changes  in inventories,
then deflated  by a production  price deflator. Capital  stock is the stock of capital reported by each firm
at the beginning  of thle  year, deflated  by the GDP deflator.
The results are presented in Table 4.  In the first column of Table 4, foreign investment  is
measured  as a zero-one  dummry  variable. A firm is defined  as "foreign"  if at least some of its equity  is
foreign-owned. After controlling  for differences  in inputs, the results  show that firms vwith  some foreign
equity (either  joint ventures  of foreign  subsidiaries)  had an 8.5 percent increase in output over domestic
firms in the same industry.  Since we already control for input differences, this 8.5  % is a pure
productivity  gain.  In the second column of Table 4, foreign ownership is modelled  as a continuous
variable which varies from 0 to 100 percent of the plant's total equity.  These results show that a 10
percent increase in foreign ownership raises a firm's productivity  by  1.36 percent.  A  100 percent
increase  in foreign  ownership  would  raise  productivity  by 13.6  percent, which is approximately  consistent
with the 8.5 % increase  we estimate  using the dummy  variable  approach in the first column  of Table 4.
If foreign owners purchase shares in only the most productive domestic firms, the foreign
iiownership variable could simply act as a proxy for an unobserved  productivity  advantage  unrelated  to
ownership. By transforming  the estimating  equation  into differences,  we eliminate  this unobserved  fixed
effect, Isolating  the productivity  Impact  of a change  In ownership  on a given plant. Table S presents  the
results of regressing  changes  in the level of total factor  productivity  on changes  in ownership,  controlling
for changes  in inputs. In column 1 foreign  investment  is modeled  as a dummy  variable,  while in column
2 it is modeled  as continuous  variable. The fourth row in column I indicates  that  joint ventures  exhibited
a level of total factor productivity  which  was 7.0 percent higher after 5 years than domestic  firms which
remained  domestically-owned. Since changes  in capital are included, this increase in productivity  is
independent  of the increase in productivity  from new investment  which might accompany  increases in
foreign  ownership. The second column  in Table 5 suggests  that firms experiencing  an increase  in foreign
ownership  of ten percentage  points were 1.1 percent more productive  after 5 years than firms which did
not change  ownership.
One possible explanation  for the productivity  advantage  accompanying  foreign  ownership  is that
foreign firms are able to pick out future high performers  and invest  their capital in those plants. Yet it
seems doubtful  that foreign investors  would possess  better information  than domestic investors,  or that
firms expecting  higher future productivity  performance  would be biased towards foreign sources of
capital. The observed  productivity  advantage  of firms with foreign  equity  participation  is consistent  with
the hypothesis  that joint ventures  possess a technological  superiority  over their domestic counterparts.
The next section examines  whether  any of this technological  advantage  'spills over" to domestic  firms.
4.  Testing for Spillovers: Empirical Results
In the theoretical  framework  outlined  above, we derived output  q, denoted as Y,(j) for plant i in
sector  j at time t, as a function  of input  x and foreign presence. Input x consists  of plant i's unsk,lled
12labor (UNSKLk, skilled labor  (SKLB,  materials  (M) and capital (K).  We meaure foreign  presence  Q
as the sLare  of foreign investment  in a particular  sector  j.'
We assume the error term a, in (11) is composed  of a random component  which varies across
plants ef and a time-varying  component  D,. To allow for the exif,ence  of industry  fixed effects, we '^o
include  in the error term an industry  componentf() which is fixed over time.  Tnis yields  the following
estimating  equation:
log Y,TQ)  u C+aj  logSKEL,  + a. log UNSKL,,  +  a, log K,
(12)
+a4 log  Mb ,  as FS,Q)  + as De  +  t  + g)  ,
We estimate  (12) for a panel of domestic plants for the years 1976 through 1989.  . &re
defined as domestically  owned if the plant is 100 percent domestically  owned over the enti-  ""le
period.  The foreign share FS(), is calculated  annually as the share of the labor force emplhv.  xi "y
foreign owned firms in four-digit sector J.'  As in (11), the coefficient on foreign share (a ,)  is
interpreted  as the net impact  of foreign  presence  on domestic  plants. This effect, as outlined in Section
2, can be either positive (due to technology spillovers)  or negative, as  foreign competition drives
domestic  firms back up their average  cost curves. To allow  for imperfect  competition,  we do not impose
the restriction  that the coefficients  on the inputs are equal to their factor shares, nor do we impose
constant  returns to scale.
'The share  of foreign  investment  in the industry  is defined  more  precisely  below. Specifying  foreign
investment  as a share rather thz i an absolute  quantity  allows us to normalize  the magnitude  of foreign
presence for differences in the volume of production  across sectors.  Later, we show that using the
absolute  quantity of foreign investnent does not affect the robustness  of our results.
' The variable  FS() can  be measured  using the share of output, capital,  or labor employed  by foreign
firms in a given  sector; since  all three variables  gave similar results, we only present  the regressions  for
which FSO)  is defined  to be the share of workers  in sectorj employed  by foreign-owned  firms, weighted
by the share of capital  in those rms  which are foreign-owned.
134.1  The Impact of Foreign Investment:  Reproducing Earlier Results
Previous tests for spillovers were performed by Globerman (1978) for Canadian data and
Blomstrom  and Persson (1983)  for Mexican  data. These researchers  used cross-section  industry  data to
estimate some variation of  (12) at the sectoral level, where the coefficient on foreign share was
interpreted  as a measure  of spillovers  from foreign presence  to domestic  firms.  Past studies generally
estimated  a positive value for this coefficient,  although  it was not always statistically  significant. Since
previous  researchers  relied primarily  on cross-section  estimation,  they were forced to ignore  any sector-
specific fixed effect, which is captured by f()  in (12).  If foreign investors  tend to gravitate towards
industries  which  have a higher level of total factor productivity,  then the variable  FS() will be positively
correlated with the error term, and the OLS estimate  of the impact  of foreign presence will be biased
upwards. Indeed, evidence  from Venezuelan  manufacturing  firms suggests  this is the case.
To illustrate, the first row of table 6 estimates  (12) without  controlling  for the fixed effect f(j).
The coefficients  on the inputs are all positive  and statistically  significant,  as expected. The coefficient
on unskilled  labor is three times as high as for skilled  labor, indicating  the higher share  of unskilled  labor
in total labor payments in Venezuela. The coefficient  on FS(), is positive and statistically  significant,
and the point estimate  is in the same range as the results obtained in earlier work.  The point estimate,
0.061, suggests  that if the share of labor employed  by foreign-owned  firms rose from 0 to 10 percent of
the manufacturing  sector, output would increase by 0.6 percent.  Since the estimation controls for
increases  in inputs, this 0.6 increase is a pure (total factor) productivity  gain.
One way to correct for the bias caused  by an industry  fixed effect is to introduce  sector dummy
variables  to control for f(j) in (12). This would allow  for fixed  productivity  differences  across industries
caused  by unobserved  factors, exploiting  the time series and within-industry  variation  in productivity  to
isolate the impact of foreign investment. The second row in Table 6 reports the estimation  results
including  industry  dummies  at the two-digit  level. Including  industry  dummies  causes  the coefricient  on
14foreign investment  to switch from positive  to negative  and statistically  insignificant. Introducing  fcur-
digit industry  dummy  variables  changes  the estimate  even  more  dramatically. Controlling  for productivity
differences  at the four-digit  level, industries  with greater  foreign  presence  are significantly  less productive
than those with no foreign presence.  The negative  impact is large and statistically  significant. The
results in the third row of Table 6 imply  that an increase  in the share of foreign  investment  from 0 to 10
percent is accompanied  by a decline  in total factor productivity  of 2.2 percent for domestic  plants.'°
This evidence  suggests that previous findings of a positive impact of foreign investment  of
domestic productivity  are not robust to the inclusion  of industry, but reflect the tendency of foreign
investment  to take place in more productive  industries. If we interpret  the coefficient  in thc context of
the theoretical  equation (11), the negative  coefficient  we observe in table 6 is consistent with a large
detrimental  impact  of foreign  presence on the scale of domestically-owned  production.
4.2  Separating Technology  from Demand Effects
A negative  coefficient  on foreign share does not preclude the possibility  that some technology
transfer from joint ventures  to domestic firms does occur.  For example,  foreign investment  could be
associated  with declining  nroductivity  on aggregate  and at the same  time convey  substantial  benefits to
those few plants located nearby.  In this section we attempt to disentangle  the possible technology
spiliovers  from the demand  effects  using the dispersion  of foreign invcstment  across regions.
In many  theories  of technology  transfer, where technology  is broadly  defined  to include  anything
which allows  the firm to produce  more efficiently,  the transfer of technology  takes  place at a local level.
10  lhe  results are almost equivalent when we estimate (12) using "within" estimates, which are
computed  by subtracting from each variable its sector mean and running OLS on the transformed
variables.  The reason why the two sets of estimates  are not exactly equivalent  is because we include
time-dummy  variables, and the within estimates  capture the interaction  between the time and industry
effects.
15Whether  trained workers  leave the joint venture to work at nearby domestic  firms, or whether  the joint
venture demonstrates  a product, process  or market  previously  unknown  to domestic  owners,  the benefits
are likely to be received by neighboring  domestic  firms first before they diffuse to other, more distant
domestic firms.  To the extent that technology  is transferred  locally, estimation  of (12) should include
a variable which measures  foreign presence  within each region.  It is also likely that the negative  effect
of foreign  investment  is more likely to occur at the aggregate  level, as domestic  firms compete  with  joint
ventures  in national  markets. To test for the possibility  that technology  is transferred  at the local level,
we broaden the analysis to include both regional and sectoral foreign share variables in the same
regression. We modify  equation  (6) to assume  that a domestic  firm's technology  is a function  of foreign
presence  in its region s, as weli as regional fixed factors a,:
Al-III  as  eo  (13)
Equation (11) now becomes
logq 1 - C+logx 1 + a Q8 +yQ  +loga, + log i,  (14)
The coefficient  a determines  the impact  of regional foreign  presence, while the coefficient y  captures
the effect of national  foreign investment. To estimate  a, we include in the regression FS(,sX, defined
u  the share of industry  3's workers in region s employed  by foreign firms located in the industry and
region. The "unadjusted"  estimation  is given  by
logY,,  - Constant  +  a  X  logSKL +  aslog  UNSKL, +  as logM
(15)
+a4 logK&,  +5S  FS(f)t  + s"  FS(sA),  +a7D, +flj) +a(s) +tv
16where  fC) is captured  by a dummy  variable  Indicating  the firm's four-digit Industry,  and is included  to
control  for any industry-level  factors.
If the location-specific  productivity  term a(s),  is positively  correlated  with foreign  sh&ar,  FS(sJ)
over-estimates  the impact  of location-specific  foreign  investment  on productivity. For example,  foreign
firms may be  more attracted to  regions which benefit from  agglomeration economies or  bettor
infrastructure;  we could observe a correlation between domestic productivity and foreign share in a
location  even in the absence  of spillovers. Variations  in productivity  due to agglomeratwn  economies
or other region-specific  effects  may be captured  by levels  in the real skilled wage. For the United  States,
Rauch  (1991)  also provides  empirical  evidence  that variations  in human  capital  accumulation  across cities
is reflected in higher wages for indiv!nuals. Another factor which can be used to capture exogenous
differences in productivity across regions in Venezuela is the price of energy.  The government
encouraged relocation to  some regions by  implementing  uneven energy subsidies acrou  regions.
Differences  in electricity  prices  could  have affected  both productivity  as well as foreign relocation  across
regions.
Including  the log of the skilled wage for all industries  in region  s Oog  Wage(s)) and the log of
eectricity prices (og Elecp(s). can be used to control for these location-specific  productivity  effects.
The resulting "adjusted" estimation  equation  Is given  by
logY - Constn  +  allogSKL,, +  xlogUNSKL*,+ a5logM4  +a4logK,
(16)
+as FS(f),+ axFS(sJ),+  aD,+ a. log  Wage(s), +  a  ogEkcp(s), +ftj)  +g1
Since  foreip  investment  in any one four-digit  industry  is unlikely  to significantly  affect the skilled  wage
for all industries  in the region, the skilled wage will be independent  of FS(sJ),.
Foreign share, electricity  prices, and the skilled wage are calculated  at the district level. Venezuela
17is divided into 23 regions, which in turn are subdivided  into districts.  Regions  may have several or as
many as 20 districts.  In all, the total number of region-district  locations adds up to 220 separate
locations.  In a country  one-third  larger than  the state of Texas, this indicates  that the average  district size
is 40 miles wide by 40 miles long (1600 square miles). Appendix  Table A.  I shows the average share
of  labor employed at  foreign owned firms  and  the  standard deviation of  this  measure across
region-districts. The size of the standard  deviations  in Table A. I indicates  that foreign  presence is not
uniformly  distributed  across industries  and across regioni."
Estimates  of the impact  of regional  foreign  share on domestic  firm productivity  are given  in Table
7.  The coefficients  on sectoral foreign investment  are negative  and significant  as before.  For both the
adjusted and unadjusted estimates, the  coefficient on  regional foreign investment is  statistically
insignificant,  and when  the real skilled  wage and electricity  prices are included,  the coefficient  on foreign
investment  falls to zero.  We find a consistently  positive and large association  between the real skilled
wage and individual  firm productivity. The association  with electricity  prices (although  much smaller)
is also statistically  significant  and negative  as expected. This suggests  that foreign  investment  is likely
to locate in areas with highly productive  skilled workers  or lower energy prices, biasing the unadjusted
estimates  upwards.  We also experimented  with other measures which might reflect location-specific
productivity differences, such  as  the  number of  firms  in  each  location, rent  prices,  and  the
industry-specific  skilled wage in the location,  but the results were unchanged.
The within  estimates  are reported  in the last row of Table 7.  These estimates  were computed  by
subtracting  from each variable  its region-sector  mean over time.  This formulation  allows  us to control
for any unobserved  differences  across regions  and sectors. It would  be equivalent  to including  both sector
and region dummies  in the estimation,  as well as sector-region  interactive  terms.  The within estimates
'"Although  the table shows  industry  values at the two-digit  level, the regressions  were estimated  with
all industry variables  calculated  at the four-digit  level.
18support the results in the first and second rows,  indicating no statistically signiflcant impact of
region-specific  foreign  investment  on domestic  firm productivity  growth.
Two conclusions  can be drawn  from the results presented  in the previous two sections. The first
is  ihat  if technology  transfer indeed  takes place, it is overwhelmed  by the negative  productivity  effects
of joint ventures  on domestically-owned  firms.  The second is to the extent that domestic and foreign
firms compete  on national  (and not local) markets, there is no evidence  to support the hypothesis  that
technology  is transferred  locally  from  joint ventures  to domestically-owned  firms. It is interesting  to note
that the empirical results confirm case study evidence for Venezuela claiming very little cases of
technology  transfer  from multinationals  to domestically-owned  firms  (Matos(1977)).  In the next section,
we explore the robustness  of our results.
43  Alternative Specifications
One  possible explanation  for the insignificant  coefficient  on regional  foreign presence  is the fact
that  new  technology  may only slowly  filter through  to domestic  firms. Consequently,  the positive  impact
of foreign investment  on observed  productivity  may not appear for several years.  It is also likely that
the negative  effect. of foreign  investment  would  dissipate  over time as the adverse  impact  of competition
disappeared.
One simple test for this is to  examine the impact of foreign investment  on domestic firm
productivity  growth over a longer time horizon. Table 8 presents a "long difference' version of Table
7, using one-year, two-year,  three-year  and four-year  differences  of all the dependent and independent
variables  instead  of deviations  from sector-region  means. Our previous  results are generally  maintained
in this dynamic  specification,  although  some interesting  differences  emerge. We continue  to see a strong
negative  impact  of sectoral foreign share and a generally  insignificant  (but positive)  impact  of regional
19forsign share on productivity. 7The  trends In the point estimates,  however, are  quite interesting. The
negative  impact  of sectoral foreign  presence  diminishes  slightly  over time.  At the same time, the point
estimates  on regional foreign  presence  become  more positive  and increase  in magnitude  over time.  The
coefficient  on the three year lag for foreign  share Is positive  and statistically  significant,  but the estimate
is smaller  and insignificant  for the fourth  lag. These  results  on local foreip  presence  provide  some weak
evidence  of technology  spillovers.
Another possibility is that foreign investment  is specified incorrectly. The specification  used
earlier in the paper Is a weighted  average of foreign  investment  in each sector, where foreign  investment
is defined as the share of the plant's assets which are foreign owned and the weights are given by the
number  of employees  in the plant. Table 9 reports the coefficient  on foreign  share using  three alternative
definitions. First, foreign  share was redefined  as the total number  of employees  in plants where at least
5 percent of assets are foreign owned, divided by the total number of employees in all plants in that
sector. This is described  in Table 9 as 'unweighted". Second, foreign  share was redeflned  as a zero-one
variable, equal to one if there is any foreign  investment  at all in a region. This specification  could only
be applied to the regional estimates,  since there is some foreign invtstment  in all sectors in Venezuela.
T'he  rationale  for this specification  is that the Impact  of foreign  Investment  may  be nonlinear. One foreign
plant in a sector could potentially  have as much impact  on technology  transfer as several foreign firms.
Finally, instead  of defining foreign presence as a share, we redefined it as the number of employees
employed  by foreign  firms. We also included  total employment  in the regression  to control  for aggregate
employment  changes. This specification  is the closest  to the theoretical  model developed  earlier.  This
specification  provides a test of whether the negative coefficient  on foreign share could be due to the
possibility  that foreign firms do not adjust quickly  to economic  downturns,  while domestic firms react
immediately. This would lead us to observe a rising foreign share during periods of economic  decline.
The results presented in Table 9 suggest that the impact of sectoral foreign ir ;estment on
20domestic  plant productivity  Is robust to alternative  specifications  for foreign  presence.  The coefficient
on "unweigiited' foreign  presence, at botb the sector and regional level is statistically  significant  and
negative. If we define foreign  investmnent  as a zero-one  dummy  variable in each re-ion, the results are
mixed.  The levels  estimates  give a positive  and statistically  significant  coefficient  on regional  DFI, but
the coefficient  in the within  estimates  is significantly  negative. The within estimates  are more likely to
be unbiased,  since the levels estimation  captures  the fact that foreign invasunent  is attracted to regions
with higher  productive  capacity.  Finally, we present separate  estimates  for the numerator (number  of
employees  in plants  with foreign  equity)  and  the denominator  (total sectoral  employment)  used to calculate
the foreign share variable. The results confirm  that defining  foreign investment  as a share variable does
not lead to spurious  results. The coefficient  on foreign  iiivestment  continues  to be statistically  significant
and negative  at both the sector and region level.  Total employment  within a sector has a positive but
insignificant  impact  on domestic  plant productivity.
These results point to two robust, but quite different conclusions  about the impact of foreign
investment  on productivity  in Venezuela's  manufacturing  sector.  On the one hand, plants with rising
foreign participation  exhibit significant  and positive productivity  gains over time.  On the other hand,
plants which do not receive foreign  investment  appear  to suffer as a result of increases  in joint venture
activity. One natural question  to ask is what is the net impact  of these two offsetting  forces? Table 10
combines  all plants to estimate the impact  of foreign investment  using aggregate  data.  Although the
results are not directly comparable  to the plant-level  estimation,  they do provide evidence  regarding the
aggregate  effects of foreign investment  on productivity. The results show that the positive effects far
outweigh  the negative impact, in part because the estimates  at the aggregate  level give much greater
weight  to larger plants. The within  estimates  suggest  that an increase  in foreign investment  from 10 to
2120 percent of the manufacturing  sector would  increase  aggregate  productivity  by S.  1 percent.h
5.  Conclusion
Many  developing  countries  now actively  solicit  foreign  investment,  offering  income  tax holidays,
import  duty exemptions,  and subsidies  to foreign  firms.  One justification  for subsidizing  these firms is
the so-called  "spillover' of technology  from foreign  to domestic  firms. Despite  the significant  interest in
the possibilit,;  of such spillovers,  there have been no empirical  tests using micro  data.  Using a panel of
more than 4000 Venezuelan  plants between 1975 and 1989, this pape-r  tests for the existence of
technology  transfer via foreign firms.
First, we examine  the relative performance  of joint ventures  and domestic  firms.  We find that
plants  with some foreign  investment  consistently  outperform  domestic  plants. We also find that increases
in foreign  equity  participation  are strongly  correlated  with increases  in plant productivity. This suggests
that the host country  does benefit from foreign equity participation  through the irnproved  performince
of joint ventures.
Second, we measure  the impact  of joint venture activity and wholly owned foreign  subsidiaries
on the productivity  of plants who receive  no foreign investment.  Facing fewer data limitations  thaii any
of the previous  studies, we find that foreign  investment  negatively  affects  productivity  of domestic  fiiT.
These negative  effects are large and robust  to alternative  specifications  of the model. Although  previous
studies generally  found  positive effects,  we show that these results can be explained  by the tendency  for
multinationals  to locate in the more productive  sectors.
We conclude that there do exist benefits from foreign investment,  but that such benefits are
internalized  by  joint ventures. In other words, foreign  investment  provides direct benefits  to those firms
22  The within estimates  differ from the dummy variable estimates  presented in the second row
because  the dummy  variable specification  does not include  time-industry  interactive  terms.
22receiving  the investment,  but there are no 'spillovers' to other plants. This suggests  that industrializing
countries suich  as Venezuela  are correct in emphasizing  the benefits from foreign investmeu  t to  e
recipients,  However, we also conclude that less emphasis  should be placed on any externalitiV .r
"spillovers' to other local firms.
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25l'able  1:  The Share  of Foreign  Direct  Investment  in Manufacturlng
(percent  weighted  by number  of  employees)
r  ..L_:  =2  .....  =-..  -.- - - . .1  - __________________
_________1  91976  El  1981  1989
'.  rPduriAuts  8  5  6
Testilevs  c&  Clothing  6  6  3
A 'i  1:.  oiucjus  0  0  2
,'-et  &  Publishing  10  11  9
i'  , ri.als,  Petrol  6  8  7
!  ote-ry,  Glass  6  8  7
rl  SiL  Metals  7  6  12
i  aN1hinery  9  9  13
1 ,c'essional  8  t0  4
. Equipment
26Table 2:  Distribution  of Foreign  Ownership  Acrou Sectors
(percent weighted by number of employees)
Sector  1976  1981  1989
Food Products  24  15  19
Textiles  & Clothing  16  14  6
Wood Products  0  0  1
Paper & Publishing  9  12  8
Chemicals,  Petrol  11  17  14
Pottery, Glass  6  7  6
Basic  Metals  6  7  15
Machinery  26  28  31
Professional  1  1
Equipment  . .
Total  100  100  100
27Table 3:  Comparison of productivity, export performance, and wages betwee  domestic and
foreign-owned  enterprises in ManufacturingU
Output  Real  Export  Imported  Net
per  wages  s as  Inputs  as  exports as
worker  percen  percent  percent of
s of  of sales  sales
sales
Venezuela
Food, beverages  2.0*  2.0*  0.7  4.4*  10.2*
Textiles, apparel,  1.4*  1.2*  3.  1.6  0.2*
leather  I  I
Wood products  1.4*  I  1.7*  0.0  1.7  40.2*  |
Paper products  2.2*  1.4*  5.5*  1.2  -7.1*
Chemicals  1  .4*  1  .4*  35*  1.6  -7.1*
Nonmetallic minerals  1.7*  1.7*  7.0*  4.3*  -2.6*
Basic metals  1.6*  1.3  8.3*  2.6*  18.8*
Machinery,  metal  1.7*  1.4*  10.9'  3.2*  -10.3*
products
Other manutacturing  1.6*  1.4*  0.6  3.6*  -13.5*
All sectors  1.7*  1.6  8.4*'  2.9*  |  6.9*
Ratio  o  enterp  pefor  ically owned fin  A fir  dfined  as
foreign if more than S percent of totAl asset are  foreign-owned.  An  *'  indicates that the difference is statiatic.lly
significant at the 5 percent level.
28Table 4:  Comparing  the Level of Total Factor Productivity (T?)
Betwee  Forap  and Domesticaily-Owned  Flrms
Coefficet  on Foreign  Ownership  I/
Seotor  0-1 Dummy Variable 21  Continuous Variable 3/
Food Products  0.091  0.113
(4.1)  (3.2)
Textiles and  Clothing  0.099  0.248
(3.3)  (3.9)
Wood Products  0.095  0.06S
(1.8)  (0._)
Paper  and  Publishing  0.080  0.18O
(2.9)  (4.1)
Potter, and  uLass  0.147  0.282
(5.5)  (5.2)
Buie Metals  -0.001  -0.046
(0.0)  (0.6)
Machinery and Equipment  0.077  0.104
(4.7)  (3.5)
All Industries  0.085  0.136
(6.6)  (6.4)
1/  Coefficients are  eatimated from a regrssion  of log output mgressed  on (log) materials, skiLie labor, unskilled labor,
annual time dummies, four-digit SIC industry dummies and one of 2 measures of foreign ownership.  T-statistics ae
Siven in 0.
V  Firms am considered foreign-owned if the share of foreign ownership of the firm's  capital is grter  than zero.
3/  The share  of fium  equity which is foreign owned, varies between 0 and 100%.
Table 5:  Comparing Total Factor Productivity  Growth (TFP)
Between  Foreign and Domestically-Owned  Firms
Coeffcient on Foreign Ownership  1/
Long  Differences  0-1 Dummy  Variable  2/  Continuous  Variable  3/
Two-year  differences  0.015  0.027
_________________________  ~~~(1.7)  (i.6)
Three-year  Differences  0.026  0.042
___________________________  ~~(2.4)  (2.1)
Four-year  differences  0.045  0.071
_________________________  ~~~(3.7)  (2.8)
Five-year  Differences  0.070  0.112
________________________  ~~~~(4.4)  (3.7)
1/  Coefficient are estimated from a regression of log changes in (log) output  gresed on changes in (log) materials,
skilled labor, unskilled labor and  annual time dummy variables.  T-statistics in parenthescs.
V  Coefficient on changes in foreign ownership dummy variable, equal to 1 if foreign ownership is geter  than zero.
3/  Coefficient on changes in the firm's share of capital which is foreign owned.
29Tpble 6:  Impact of Sectoral  Foreign Investment on Productivity
of Domestic Firnu
Dependent Variable  - Log Output Produced  by Domestically-Owned Firms
Sample  I  Independeut  Variables
Materials  Capital  Unskl  Ski  Foreign
Labor  Labor  Presence
Without lndustry Du  'mies  0.569  0.084  0.296  0.110  0.061
obs=35514  (327.0)  (59.2)  (103.7)  (44.7)  (1.9)
With 2-digit Dummies  0.573  0.076  0.293  0.114  -0.028
obs=35514  (272.9)  (44.7)  (84.8)  (39.4)  (0.9)
With 4-digit  Dummies  0.585  0.060  0.293  0.108  -0.223
obs-  35514  (280.2)  (36.8)  (87.7)  (39.0)  (3.8)
T-statistics in parentheses. Domestlcally-owned  firms defined as firms which had no foreign ownership
over the entire sample period.  All regressions include annual time dummy variables.
30Table  7:  Impact  of Sectoral  and Regional  Foreign  Investment  on Productivity
of Domestic  Firms
Dependent  Variable  - Log Output  Produced  by Domestically-Owned  Firms
Sample  Independent  Variables
Materials  Capital  Unskl  Skl  Wage  Elec  Regional  Swctoral
Labor  Labor  Price  Foreign  Foreign
Presence  Presence
Adjusted  0.585  0.060  0.290  0.106  0.111  .0.019  -0.001  -0.224
obs  =  34236  (275.4)  (36.2)  (85.8)  (37.9)  (16.2)  (4.8)  (0.0)  (4.1)
Within  0.572  0.060  0.294  0.103  40.013  0.002  -0.014  -0.217
Estimation
obs  = 34236  (250.1)  (35.2)  (83.3)  (35.5)  (1.3)  (0.4)  (0.3)  (3.5)
T-statistics  in parentheses.  Domestically-owned  firms  defined  as firms  which  had no foreign  ownership
over the entire sample  period. All regressions  include  annual  time dummy  variables. Adjusted  and
Within regressions  include  the overall skilled wage in the region and electricity  prices.  Adjusted
regressions  include  4-digit  industry  dummy  variables.
Table 8:  Long Run Impact of Foreign  Investment
on Domnestic  Pro(.Xctlvlty:  Long Differences
Sectoral DFI  Regional  DPI
One  Period  -0.165  -0.006
Obs  = 25766  (2.5)  (0.1)
Two Periods  -0.184  -.001
Obs  = 17691  (2.7)  (0.0)
Three  Periods  -0.184  0.118
Obs= 11901  (2.3)  (2.0)
Four  Periods  -0.158  0.062
Obs  =7873  (1.7)  (0.9)
31Table 9:  Alternate Specifications  for DFI
Specification  Sectoral DFI  Regional  DFI
Unweighted Levels 1/  -0.146  -0.029
(5.3)  (1.9)
Unweighted  Within 1/  -0.145  -0.029
(1.2)  (5.0)
Zero-One Levels 2/  -0.196  0.030
(3.5)  (6.0)
Zero-One Within 2/  -0.112  -0.023
__________________________  (1.9)  (3.4)
Separate  Estimates for Numerator  (foreign employment)  and Denominator (total employment)
Employees in Foreign Plants  -22.0  -69.8
3/  (3.1)  (2.5)
Employeesin All Plants 3/  0.8  2.2
IL_  1~~~~~  (0.7)  (0.7)
1/  DFI is defined as the total number of employees in plants with at least 5% of assets foreign
owned, divided by the total number of employees in all plaits  in that sector.
2/  DFI at the regional level defined as a zero-one variable, equal to 1 if there is any DFI in the
region.
3/  DFI defined as the total number  of employees in foreign  plants.  Total employment  in the sector
included as a control variable.
32Table 10:  Impact of foreign Investment  on total factor
productivity  using aggregate  datau
Plant-level  date aggregated to industry-level  Coefficient  on Foreigp Share 2'
All plants:  foreign and domestic
No industry dummy  0.567
Variables  (6.0)
Industry dummy  0.357
Variables included  (3.4)
Within estimates  0.505
(4.8)
Only wholly domestically-owned  plants__
No industry  dummy  0.1 1
Variables  (1.2)
Industry dummy  -0.468
Variables  included  (4.5)
Within estimates  -0.487
(4.8)
Log total output in the four-digit sector is regressed  on the foreign share of the sector, the logs
of sectoral materials, skilled labor, unskilled labor, and annual time dummies.  T-statistics are
given in ( ).
2v  Coefficients  correspond  to total labor  employed in foreign-owned  firms in a 4-digit sector divided
by the total labor force in that sector.
2'  Firms are defined as wholly domestically-owned  if they retain 100  percent domestic ownership
throughout the sample period.
33Appendix Table A.1:  The Share of Labor enployed  at Foreign-owned
Firnm - Means and Standard Deviations  across Region-Districts
Sector  - Average Foreign Share
T  1975-77  1  1982-84  198648  1
Food Products  2.8%  2.7%  3.6%
___________  __  (10.5%)  (10.5%)  (13.8%)
Textiles  & Clothing  1.1  0.9
(5.5)  ('.S)  (6.3)
Wood Products  0.2  0.4  1.0
(2.2)  (3.2)  (7.1)
Paper & Publishing  6.8  8.6  7.2
_  _________________  (11.8)  (16.7)  (16.7)
Pottery ard Glass  2.8  3.8  4.4
(8.4)  (13.8)  (14.5)
Basic Metals  5.0  4.8  5.9
___  ___  ___  ___  _  _  (12.6)  (12.6)  (13.8)
Machines  and  3.1  3.2  3.7
Equipment  (10.0)  (10.5)  (11.8)
Standard  deviations  in parentheses




This appendix  extends  the model  presented  in the paper to allow for entry and exit of domestic
firms.
Zero Profts and Free Entry
We extend the model to allow for the impact of foreign investment  on entry and exit of
domestically-owned  firms, accounting  for the optimal  firm behavior  given  in (5)  We show  the estimation
in equation 11 remains  unchanged  with entry and exit, provided  the least efficient  domestic  firms are the
first to be driven out by foreign competition.
Domestically-owned  firms enter or exit until the marginal  firm earns zero profits. Firm i earns
profits according  to
R-(P-m)qj-F,  (Al)
Substituting into this expression the first  order condition for  profit maximization  under Cournot
competition,  profits become
We allow  for the possibility  that not all firms have the same fixed costs, and we assume  that as
firms enter, each new firm faces a higher fixed cost than the previous entrant; firms continue  to enter
until the marginal  firm receives  zero profits.  To capture this fixed cost relationship,  we assume  fixed
costs for the ith firm are given by
36FIuF(I)  F'>O  (A3)
Combining  equation  (A2) and (A3)
I
1
1 uq 2 -F(aT)  (A4)
There exists a marginal  firm n such that profits in (A4) are zero.  This firm produces q, according to
(AS):
q.F^)  2 (AM)
Firn symmetry  guarantees  the level of output in (AS) will be productd by all firms:
qjmF(n) 2 (A6)
Equations  (5) and (A6)  jointly determine  the level of output  and the number  of firms which satisfy both
the profit maximization  and the zero profit conditions. To solve for the level of output explicitly, we
rewrite (A6) in terms of n:
n sF-'(q:))  (A7)
Combining  (A7) with the reaction  function  in (5) gives
qF.;  p-Q*gM  (A8)
F3'(q)
37Equation  (AS) implicitly  defines  equilibrium  domestic  firm output  q1(Q) as a function  of foreign  output.
Applying  the implicit  function  theorem  to (AS) gives
dqi ,[  '  (1+2gq  P-2-,  F-(Q,)-']<O  (M9)
dQ*  mel  (n+1) 2
which is negative  when  P-1'>,,O  Substituting  (A9) into (IOB)  gives the equation  for  y  accounting
for entry and  exit:
ye  [  (I+2q. (ne  1  F  (Q)-9]<O  (AIO)
q2(o)  nm  elV
Provided  F-11  is positive, allowing  free entry and exit does not change  the
result that foreign entry reduces domestic  productivity  by forcing domestic firms to spread their fixed
costs over lower output.
Ihis prediction  holds only if fixed costs vary across domestic  firms.  If fixed costs are identical
for all firms  (F"-l O) then enough domestic firms exit in response to foreign entry such that eacii
remaining domestic firm's output remains unchanged  (y  - 0).  iLf,  however, fixed costs vary across
firms, and firms with the highest  fixed cost are the first to exit, then the domestic  output will contract
in response  to foreign  entry partially through the exit of domestic  firms and partly through lower levels
of production  for remaining  domestic  firms.
Although allowing entry and exit does not change the estimation  equation, it does introduce
sample selection  bias when estimating y.  Exit insures that foreign entry drives out the least efficient
firms in the sector, lowering the  sector's average fixed cost; the firms which remain in sectors
experiencing  high foreign  presence will be more productive,  resulting in biased  estimates  of the impact
of foreign presence on a domestic firm's productivity. We show below that entry and exit bias the
38estimated  'y to be higher (lees  negative)  than the true -y.
Estimation Blases Introduced with Entry and Exit
We begin with the equation  for firm i's output derived in equation
log  q, u C+ logx +(  +  y)Q  +%,  (Bi)
where it is recalled  that entry and exit implies
Cf.  F,  (n+1)  (82)
We are interested  in estimating  the impact  of foreign  presence on the productivity  of domestic
firm i.  The problem arises that Ci in equation is correlated with foreign output.  To determine the
direction  of the bias, we rewrite equation  Bl in matrix form:
logq - Xo  yQ  +C  (B3)
where log q, Q  and C are Nxl matrices,  X is a Nx(K-1)  matrix of independent  variables, 6 is a (K-I)xl
matrix  of coefficients,  and 'y is the coefficient  representing  the impact  of foreign  investment  on a domestic
firm's output after accounting  for other factors.
The OLS estimate  of y is defined  to be
t1 (QofMQ  Q)'T  Q11  Mx 8 ogq)
39*  y(Q8  IMQ  Q)-IQ  IMQ  +  (Q'M 1 Q.)  4Qh'C
mY  + (QM  QT)-  Q'MsQ  +  (Q'MsQ*) Qs C
my  +(QM 1 Q')-,Q  C  (B4)
where  Q"M.  represents  the element  of Q orthogonal  to the matrix X.  To determine  the direction  of
the bias we compute the correlation between Q' and C.  We show that Q  is positively correlated with
C, and therefore  the estimate  y  is biased  upward,  understating  the negative  impact  of foreign  presence
on the domestic  firm's productivity.
To determine  the correlation  between  Q  and C, we examine  the interaction  between  Q  and the
stochastic  term Fi in equation B2.  Firm i's fixed costs can be decomposed  into the average fixed cost
for industry  j to which firm i belongs, and the deviation  of firm i's fixed  costs from the industry  average.
The average fixed cost in industry  j (denoted  FQ))  is determined  by
FJE)  =  n  f  F(u)du  (B5)
40where n(j) is given  by equation 12 in the text to be
nU)  -F- 1 (q2 (Q*Q)))  (B6)
Differentiating  equation  B6 with respect to foreign  output in sector  j gives
dn)  s-F-  l <O  (B7)
dQOj)  dQ'
Exogenous  increases  in foreign  output result in the fall in the number  of domestic  firms in the industry.
We can now determine  the effect of foreign  output  on average  fixed costs by differentiating  equation  B5
with respect  to Q:
dFQ) =  dFU)  ='%Q)  co  (B8)
dQ  dnQ) dQQ)
Average  fixed costs in the sector fall with foreign investment  as foreign entry drives out the domestic
firms with the highest  fixed costs.
To solve the correlation  between  Q' and F 1 let  Q'  denote  the average foreign output actoss
sectors, and similarly  let  F  be  .verage  fixed costs for all domestic  firms.
41The correlation  between  F, and Q' ()  is given by
E,Ay[F 1-FJ[QQ'  -Q'
mE,EFF,  ) -F)+.][Q()-QJ  (B9)
"E,EA(FaJ(J))(QQ)  Q0  +(  4)XQ(j -Q)]
UEAFQ)-J'(QQ)-Q)1  0°
and is negative  from equation  B8.
Since  F 1is negatively  correlated  witL.  Q(i) it follows  that  C=-FPl-R  is positively  correlated
with Q(j).  lherefore  t  understates  the true negative  impact  of foreign presence  on domestic
productivity.
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